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Politicization of science occurs when the inherent uncertainty of science is emphasized to 
cast doubt on scientific consensus. Climate change has become particularly susceptible to 
this kind of politicization. In this paper, we report the results of a survey experiment in 
which we manipulated text frames and visual imagery associated with two types of 
environmental hazards linked to climate change – sea level rise with associated flooding 
and increased heat levels with associated drought and wildfires.  We present evidence 
that the use of visual imagery can counter the effects that science politicization has on 
climate change beliefs and behaviors. 
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 Initiatives informed by scientific findings can improve people’s lives and generate 
knowledge that can be the basis for effective public policies.  However, climate science 
in the United States has become politicized as a result of actors emphasizing the inherent 
uncertainty of science in an effort to cast doubt on the existence of a scientific consensus 
(Druckman, 2017; van der Linden et al., 2017).  This politicization of science causes 
individuals to dismiss otherwise credible evidence and become uncertain about whether 
science can be trusted when invoked in political debates (Bolsen & Druckman, 2015).  
 In general, public trust in science has declined in the United States among 
political conservatives (Gauchat, 2012; Hmielowski et al., 2014; Mooney, 2012), 
particularly for those aspects of science that could be considered as “impact science”, 
including such issues as public health, the environment, and climate change (McCright et 
al., 2013).  Conservatives’ antipathy towards climate science in particular has manifested 
itself in both the legislative and the executive branches of the federal government on such 
topics as reduction in support of the Paris Agreement to limit carbon emissions, increased 
federal interest in increasing US coal production, and reductions in standards for energy 
efficiency (Selby, 2018). 
 Climate change is perhaps the paradigmatic example of how science politicization 
can sow doubt among the public over the veracity of scientific consensus messages 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011; Oreskes & Conway, 2010) particularly in the United States 
(Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2015; Palm, Lewis, & Feng, 2017).  Given the urgency of 
this problem, and the increased isolation of the United States from the rest of the world 
community with respect to climate change policy, there is a pressing need to find ways to 
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improve the effectiveness of communication about the scientific evidence for climate 
change and strategies to reduce the effects of science politicization.  
 A large literature explores how frames and strategic messages affect citizens’ 
opinions and beliefs about various aspects of climate change (for reviews, see Bolsen & 
Shapiro, 2017; Moser, 2010; O’Neill & Smith, 2014).  We build on existing research in 
three key ways: first, we evaluate how heretofore understudied frames in communication 
that emphasize sea level rise and coastal flooding or increased incidences of summer 
heat, drought and wildfires affect individuals’ beliefs about climate change; second, we 
assess the impact of climate science politicization in competition with these distinct 
environmental impact frames given that few existing studies explicitly account for its 
presence when studying climate messaging efforts; and, third, we explore the efficacy of 
compelling visual imagery in conjunction with textual frames as a way to counter climate 
science politicization.  
 Data were collected in a large survey experiment conducted in May 2018.  The 
experiment manipulated the presence of frames and images highlighting environmental 
hazards that are associated with climate change within the U.S.: sea level rise and coastal 
flooding of a major U.S. city (Boston), frames emphasizing climate change’s effect on 
increased incidences of wildfires, droughts and heat waves, and the presence of climate 
science politicization. The results we report demonstrate that compelling frames affect 
citizens’ beliefs and behaviors.  In line with prior research, climate science politicization 
stunts credible textual frames.  However, compelling imagery presented with the textual 
frames effectively counteracts science politicization and restores the impact of a 
consensus message. 
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Emphasis Framing Effects and Climate Change Beliefs 
 
 Framing affects individuals’ beliefs about various aspects of climate change.  A 
frame consists of a word, phrase, or image that highlights a subset of the potentially 
relevant considerations toward any attitude object (e.g., candidate, issue, policy) 
(Druckman, 2001; Chong & Druckman, 2007).1  For example, a message that makes the 
environmental impacts resulting from climate change more salient may cause greater 
relative emphasis on considerations about the environment when forming an overall risk 
assessment (Nisbet, 2009).2  
 Frames provided by journalists in media serve as narrative devices that help the 
public understand social problems, assign responsibility, and identify potential solutions 
(Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).  Experimental studies have tested the 
effect of strategically framed messages, for instance, relating the existence of a scientific 
consensus regarding human-made climate change, on beliefs and behaviors (Bolsen & 
Druckman, 2018; Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Deryungina & Shurchkov, 2016; 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015). Lewandowsky et 
al. (2013) demonstrated that exposure to a frame highlighting the fact that 97% of climate 
 
1 This class framing effects is distinct from equivalency framing effects identified by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) in which information cast in a positive or negative light 
can lead to unconscious cognitive processing biases that shift opinions (Levin, Schneider, 
& Gaeth, 1998; Druckman, 2004). 
2 When individuals are simultaneously exposed to competing emphasis frames of equal 
strength (i.e., directionally opposed frames toward the same attitude object) the effects of 
each individual frame may be cancelled out in competition (Chong and Druckman, 2007). 
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scientists believe in human-caused climate change increases individuals’ perception that a 
scientific consensus exists, acting as a gateway belief that influences other fundamental 
beliefs about climate change and increasing support for action (also see, van der Linden 
et al., 2014; van der Linden et al., 2016).  
 Prior research finds that many Americans view climate change as a low priority 
issue, and something that will mostly impact people in far away places in the distant 
future (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Morton et al. 2011).  One strategy scholars 
recommend to change this perception is to highlight the local and regional impacts that 
are already occurring as a result of climate change (Leiserowitz, 2007; Spence, Poortinga, 
& Pidgeon, 2012). Along these lines, Bolsen, Kingsland, and Palm (2018) show that 
exposure to a frame accentuating sea level rise in one of two major U.S. cities as a result 
of polar ice melt caused individuals to increase perceptions that climate change will have 
a negative impact on U.S. coastal cities, express greater concern about the effects of 
climate change on communities in the U.S., and increase their belief that global warming 
is occurring.  In another study, Scannell and Gifford (2013) found that frames 
emphasizing the local impact of climate change were more impactful on beliefs than 
frames that made salient its effects on distant locations (also see, Myers et al., 2012).  We 
extend this literature by: (a) testing the impact of an understudied class of frames on 
climate beliefs; and, (b) accounting for the effects of rhetorical competition in the form of 
science politicization, a defining feature of climate debates in the U.S. 
 Politicization of Science 
 
 Existing scholarship makes clear that exposure to framed messages can shift 
beliefs about climate change, but largely fails to account for the politicization of science 
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as a countervailing rhetorical force that may stunt otherwise effective frames.  Science 
politicization involves more than simply the existence of conflict or debates among 
partisans on a given issue (Druckman, 2017). It occurs when an actor such as an elected 
official or interest group accentuates the inherent uncertainty of scientific evidence to cast 
doubt on the existence of a consensus, generating uncertainty and anxiety about whether 
science can be trusted when invoked in a politicized debate (Bolsen & Druckman, 2015; 
Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014).  
 U.S. media coverage of climate change has become increasingly connected with 
partisan politics since the issue gained public attention in the early 2000s.  As a response 
to growing concern in the U.S. environmental community in the 1990s regarding the 
threat posed by human-induced climate change, “a coordinated anti-environmental 
countermovement, spearheaded by conservative think tanks, and politicians… sought to 
delegitimize global environmental problems, particularly anthropogenic global warming 
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011, p. 158).  The goal was to undermine support for regulatory 
policy action, in part by recruiting non-mainstream scientists to raise questions about the 
certainty of scientific consensus evidence (e.g., see McCright & Dunlap, 2000; 2003; 
Oreskes & Conway, 2011).  McCright and Dunlap (2003) content analyzed hundreds of 
documents produced by conservative think tanks between 1990 and 1997, and found that 
climate skeptics often framed the scientific evidence supporting climate change as weak 
or non-existent.  
 Several studies have tested the process by which responsiveness to messages is 
affected by linking the message with partisan politics.  McCright et al. (2016) conducted 
an experiment to test the effectiveness of exposure to one of four different emphasis 
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frames that urged action on climate change: economic opportunity, national security, 
Christian stewardship, and public health. They found that any effect resulting from the 
frames disappeared in the presence of a counter-frame suggesting disagreement or the 
existence of scientific uncertainty.  While two of the frames, economic opportunity and 
public health, increased participants beliefs about the positive effects of policies to 
combat climate change, the presence of a denial counter-frame eliminated this effect and 
significantly reduced respondents’ beliefs in the reality of climate change, belief in the 
veracity of scientific information, and support for climate action.  In another study, 
Bolsen and Druckman (2018) found that exposure to a message that highlighted scientific 
uncertainty and the role that politics plays in shaping how scientific evidence is reported 
undermined the positive effect of communicating consensus information about human-
induced climate change on low knowledge Democrats and Republicans.  Similarly, Van 
der Linden et al. (2017) found that exposure to a message arguing that there is no 
scientific consensus on human-caused climate change decreased perceptions of scientific 
agreement and undermined the otherwise persuasive impact of a consensual scientific 
statement (also see, Cook, Lewandowsky & Ecker, 2017).  We extend this line of 
research by evaluating how science politicization in competition with framed messages 
highlighting the local environmental impacts of climate change affects risk perceptions.  
 Visual Imagery and Climate Beliefs 
 Science politicization may inhibit the effects of otherwise credible and impactful 
messages about climate change.  However, compelling visual imagery along with textual 
frames reinforcing image content may be one way to counter this misleading rhetorical 
tactic. Visual information is known to be an effective means of communicating complex 
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information and can improve information retention (Graber, 1990; Powell, Boomgaarden, 
De Swert, & de Vreese, 2015).  Clear and simple visual presentations of scientific 
evidence about climate change can shift the public’s beliefs toward the scientific 
consensus (Leiserowitz, 2007; O’Neill, 2013; O’ Neill & Smith, 2014; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2014).  Yet most of the research on framing effects in 
the domain of climate change has focused exclusively on how text rather than visual 
frames shape public opinion.  
 Several studies have explored how images associated with climate change affect 
individuals’ related beliefs and actions (Hart, 2011; Hart & Feldman, 2016; Leiserowitz, 
2006; O’Neill et al., 2013; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).   For example, Hart and 
Feldman (2016) found that images of solar panels effectively increased perceptions of 
personal efficacy and indirectly promoted intentions to conserve energy as a way to fight 
climate change.  Much of the prior research cataloguing dominant visual narratives in 
news stories about climate change in the U.S. demonstrates that the most common visual 
frames center around political conflict with pictures of individuals being most prominent, 
followed by geographically distant images of negative effects that will result from 
unchecked pollution (O’Neill, 2013; O’Neill et al., 2013).3 Visual imagery associated 
with climate change is also a feature of cable news stories on climate change (e.g., see 
Feldman et al., 2012), and outlets vary in the way in which they frame the issue, with 
 
3 O’Neill (2013) explains, “This ‘distancing’ visual frame is exemplified through generic 
images of industrial smokestacks, ice imagery or non-human nature, rather than as an 
issue with impacts causes and solutions close to home” (p. 16). 
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consequences for public understanding of climate science (Hmielowski, et al., 2014).  
  
 Imagery associated with climate change can influence beliefs about who is most 
vulnerable to its threats.  For instance, iconic photographs of polar bears and melting 
glaciers that historically dominated media coverage’s visual landscape may increase 
perceptions that it will mostly impact far away places in the distant future. Leiserowitz 
(2007) conducted a large nationally representative survey of Americans in late 2002 and 
early 2003 and asked them to name the first thought or image that came to mind when 
they heard the words “global warming.”  He identified 24 distinct thematic 
representations; however, two of the four most dominant mental images focused on 
melting ice and effects on non-human nature. Leiserowitz concluded that Americans 
“think the impacts [of climate change] will mostly affect people and places that are 
geographically distant” (2007, p. 8).  One strategy recommended to more effectively 
engage audiences involves highlighting the “local” impacts that will result from climate 
change. Leiserowitz (2007) states that, “extreme events are vivid, dramatic, and easily 
understood,” (p. 15), which provide re-occurring opportunities to educate audiences 
about the potential future impacts.4  
Maps that highlight sea level rise and its effects on coastal communities in the 
U.S. may be an effective way to shift risk perceptions and beliefs.  Retchless (2017) 
found that exposure to a map highlighting the local impacts of coastal flooding in Florida 
 
4 Leiserowitz further explains, “few Americans associate global warming with extreme 
events, such as heat waves, hurricanes, flood or drought, despite the fact that all are 
projected to increase in severity due to climate change” (p. 14).  
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on college students shifted the risk perception of respondents who were initially doubtful 
or cautious about climate change, suggesting that using interactive maps showing sea 
level rise may be an effective “frame” for engaging skeptical audiences.5  
 Images presented in conjunction with text frames often produce stronger framing 
effects (Feldman & Hart, 2018; Graber, 1996; Powell et al., 2015), but prior research in 
this area has not accounted for climate science politicization as a rhetorical counterforce 
that may undermine effective framing strategies.  Further, few studies manipulate both 
text and visual content simultaneously and no studies, to our knowledge, have explored 
whether visual imagery appearing alongside congruent text frames can combat the 
politicization of climate science and resuscitate the impact of credible and otherwise 
persuasive scientific information. 
 Based on the extant literature on emphasis framing effects, climate science 
politicization, and the power of visual imagery, we posit three hypotheses that we tested 
in the study we describe in detail below:  
1. Text emphasizing the effects of sea level rise or increased temperatures 
resulting from climate change will increase individuals’ perceptions that 
climate change is happening and important, and that it will have negative 
effects. Text emphasizing temperature rise, drought and wildfires as opposed to 
sea level rise will also increase perceptions that climate change is affecting 
daily weather. 
 
5 Retchless (2017) states, “Although interactive sea level rise maps are one of the more 
popular means of depicting detailed and local sea level rise impacts, their potential for 
engaging audiences remains largely unevaluated” (p.6). 
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2. Climate science politicization will reduce or cancel out any effects resulting 
from exposure to the framed messages.   
3. Visual imagery in conjunction with textual frames will counteract the effect 
that results from exposure to counter-frames (i.e., climate science 
politicization) and restore the impact of the textual frames.  
Van der Linden (2017) has also called for research that predicts actual behavior:  “much 
less is known about how and in what ways people’s concern about climate change drives 
them to adopt specific behaviors … future research would benefit from becoming more 
decision-focused” (p. 28).6  Given the dearth of research that evaluates how frames 
regarding climate change alone or in competition with counter-frames designed to 
generate uncertainty about scientific consensus messages affect behavioral engagement 
measures (but see Levine & Kline, 2017; Ockwell, Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2009), we also 
report how the information we provided to respondents affected their expressed interest 
in learning more about climate change and willingness to pay additional taxes to fight 
climate change.   
 
 
6 Levine and Kline (2017) argue that, “optimal frames would both increase stated support 
for climate-friendly policies and also increase people’s willingness to spend scarce 
resources of time, money, and attention communicating that support” (p. 302).  This 
literature demonstrates the importance of assessing not only how framed information 
impacts opinions but also assessing its effects on behavioral measures of engagement on 
climate change (also see, Brody et al., 2012; Lubell, Zahran, & Vedlitz, 2007; Zahran et 
al., 2006). 
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Data and methodology 
 
 Our survey of 1986 unique respondents recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) was conducted in May 2018.  MTurk is a widely used online 
crowdsourcing platform that generates more diverse samples that many randomized 
experiments that rely on undergraduate students (Berinsky et al., 2012; Paolacci et al., 
2010).  As with other convenience samples, MTurk differs in several ways from a general 
population sample (but not in ways that impede making generalizable causal inferences, 
see Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 2016); for instance, participants tend to be more 
educated and express higher levels of political interest. Nonetheless, it is commonly used 
in the social sciences to estimate causal relationships, and the results are comparable to 
identical studies fielded on general population samples (Mullinix et al., 2015).7   
Each participant was randomly assigned to a pure control condition, or to one of 
eight treatment conditions: (1) text frame that sea levels will rise according to the Fourth 
National Climate Assessment, increasing the frequency and severity of flooding along the 
Atlantic and Gulf coasts; (2) text frame that wildfires and droughts will increase in parts 
 
7 The MTurk sample we collected was large and diverse. In our sample, 26% of 
respondents identify as Republican, 26% identify as Independent, and 48% identify as 
Democrat. Recent polling from Gallup from October 1st-10th, 2018 shows 28% of 
respondents identify as Republican, 39% as Independent, and 30% as Democrat. On 
racial representativeness, 76% of respondents in our sample identify as white, 8% African 
American, 7% Asian American, and 5% Hispanic.  Further, our sample is 49% female 
and 51% male. Other descriptive statistics for the sample are available upon request from 
the corresponding author. 
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of the West and South as a consequence of rising global temperatures according to the 
Fourth Climate Assessment; (3) an animated map in conjunction with the text frame that 
highlights the amount of sea level rise projected to occur with a 3.5F (2.0C) increase in 
Earth’s average temperature in Boston; (4) an animated map in conjunction with the text 
frame that highlights increased incidences of heat waves, wildfires, and droughts 
illustrating the projected number of days over 100 degrees Fahrenheit across the 
continental U.S. over time.  In addition, (conditions 5–8) each of the above stimuli was 
coupled with a counter-frame that politicized the consensus information by highlighting 
scientific uncertainty and the role that politics plays in the selective reporting of evidence 
to advocate for favored policies. 
 Participants in all conditions were informed at the beginning of the survey that 
they would be asked some questions about their opinions on the issue of climate change.  
Individuals randomly assigned to the control condition immediately proceeded to answer 
the key dependent variables presented below.  Participants in all other conditions read a 
short article prior to responding to the dependent measures.  Each stimulus included a 
headline, for instance, “Report Highlights Sea Level Rise and Frequent Flooding in Parts 
of the U.S.,” followed by several sentences of related text highlighting the particular 
frame associated with each condition.  The text of the sea level rise and coastal flooding 
stimuli, for example, stated that polar ice is melting because of rising global 
temperatures, and that the report indicates “flooding will increase in frequency and 
severity along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts [and] change the landscape of coastal 
communities and make them less livable.”  The text for the conditions highlighting 
increased heat waves, droughts and wildfires focused on how such events have increased 
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as a result of rising global temperatures, and that the report predicts “that wildfires and 
droughts will increase in frequency and severity in parts of the West and South [and] 
change the landscape of these areas and make them less livable.”   
 For the conditions in which science politicization was introduced, the headline 
included the word “Debated [Report]” and several additional sentences designed to cast 
doubt on the consensual scientific information.  Similar to other experimental research 
that has employed such claims, we designed the stimuli to emphasize uncertainty about 
the information in the report by stating, “… the issue of climate change has been a point 
of intense political debate. Some say politics make it difficult to assess future changes 
that will occur as a result of climate change. There is simply too much uncertainty. 
People use science selectively to advocate for favored policies. This may be true even for 
the recent National Climate Assessment report.”  This operationalization is consistent 
with that employed in existing research on science politicization (e.g., Bolsen et al., 2014, 
Bolsen & Druckman, 2015; McCright et al., 2016; van der Linden et al., 2017).  
 Climate change is likely to have two primary impacts on the United States over 
the next decades: those related to sea level rise and coastal flooding, and those related to 
increased temperatures including heat waves, drought, wildfires and intense precipitation 
(Wuebbles, Fahey, & Hibbard, 2017).  These impacts were portrayed in our study design 
within two environmental settings.  We illustrated the impacts of sea level rise with the 
example of coastal flooding that will occur in Boston as a result of a 15 foot increase in 
the sea level associated with an increase in the Earth’s temperature of 3.5 degrees 
Fahrenheit.  We had pretested a similar stimulus using sea level rise in Miami, and found 
that the Boston example elicited a clearer response.  We created the animated map using 
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flood projection images produced by Climate Central’s “Surging Seas: Seeing Choices”.8  
The second environmental condition we tested was increased heat with associated 
drought and wildfires since weather-related events linked to climate change have 
received increasing news attention.  Moreover, climate change is often thought of 
interchangeably with global “warming” and strongly associated with heat related imagery 
(Leiserowitz, 2006; Schuldt & Roh, 2014). Some participants were randomly assigned to 
a condition that included a different animated map showing the number of days over 100 
degrees Fahrenheit over time (i.e., 1990-2010; by 2050; and by 2100) produced by 
Climate Central.9  Figure 1 displays the images that we combined to create the animated 
visual treatments.  The screenshots were merged into a moving image that cycled through 
the progression of the projected sea level rise and heat-maps, respectively.  
    [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 We measured how exposure to the treatments affected individuals’ beliefs about: 
(1) whether climate change is happening (1–7 scale, definitely not happening to definitely 
happening); (2) whether climate change will have negative / positive impacts on the U.S. 
(1–7 scale, extremely negative to extremely positive); (3) personal importance of climate 
change (1–5 scale, extremely unimportant to extremely important); (4) how much climate 
change is affecting weather in the U.S. (1= not at all; 5= a great deal); (5) interest in 
learning more about the possible effects of climate change in the U.S. (1–7 scale, 
extremely uninterested to extremely interested); and, (6) willingness to pay more in 
 
8 The images are available at: http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/maps 
9The images are available at: http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/maps/days-above-
100f-projections 
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yearly taxes so that the U.S. government can prepare to fight climate change ($0–$500 
range).   Table 1 displays the stimuli for each condition and the corresponding hypothesis 
we test. 
 




 We evaluate the impact of the experimental conditions on belief that climate 
change is happening, perceived negative impacts, and personal importance by regressing 
each dependent variable on the experimental conditions, omitting the control condition as 
the baseline in all reported analyses. We include covariates for party identification and 
level of education in estimating treatment effects for both theoretical and empirical 
reasons. First, party identification and education are both known and theoretically 
meaningful predictors of climate attitudes (Hamilton, 2011; Kahan, 2015: Kahan et al., 
2012), and thus relevant for inclusion, and second, there were random imbalances for 
both across our experimental conditions.  We expect the inclusion of these covariates to 
explain a meaningful amount of variance in our dependent variables as is consistent with 
prior research, as well as increase the efficiency of our analyses in light of slight 
imbalances in assignment across our treatment groups.10  
 
10 We conducted additional analyses in which we estimated treatment effects without the 
inclusion of education and party identification. The substantive interpretation of the 
results is the same; however, model efficiency improves with the inclusion of the 
additional covariates where we detected imbalances post-randomization.  All 
supplemental files and analyses are available upon request from the authors.  
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 The first column in Table 2 reports the impact of the experimental conditions on 
belief that climate change is happening (Model 1). First, in support of Hypothesis 1, the 
text frame emphasizing coastal flooding that will occur in the Atlantic and Gulf coasts as 
a result of sea level rise significantly increases individuals’ belief that climate change is 
happening relative to the control condition (p = .05); this effect is slightly larger when the 
text frame appears in conjunction with the animated map showing inundation of Boston 
(p = .03).11  Also in support of Hypothesis 1, Model 1 reports that the text frame 
emphasizing increased incidences of drought, heat waves, and wildfires significantly 
increased respondents’ belief that climate change is happening relative to the baseline (p 
= .02); this emphasis framing effect also strengthens when the animated map highlighting 
temperature increases in the U.S. over time appears alongside the text frames (p <.01).  
 The results reported in Table 2 (Model 2) also provide support for Hypothesis 1, 
as the text frame highlighting sea level rise and coastal flooding significantly increased 
perceptions that climate change will have negative impacts (p = .06), and this effect 
strengthens when the text frame appears alongside the animated map (p = .01).  Similarly, 
the text frame highlighting an increased incidence of droughts, wildfires, and heat waves 
significantly increased perceptions that climate change will have negative impacts (p < 
.01); this effect also strengthens when the animated map is included with the text frame 
(p <.01).   
 
11 The substantive movement on the response scales due to the experimental conditions 
can be easily interpreted as it roughly reflects the size of the regression coefficient in 
each model. 
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 However, when we looked at the effects of the treatment on whether or not the 
respondents viewed climate change as an important issue, we found different results.  The 
text frame alone highlighting sea level rise did not increase perceived personal 
importance of climate change (Table 2, Model 3); however, when the frame was coupled 
with the animated map showing inundation of Boston, respondents reported significantly 
higher levels of the issue’s personal importance (p = .09).  The text frame emphasizing 
increased incidences of drought and heat waves, in support of Hypothesis 1, significantly 
increased the perceived importance of the issue (p = .01), and this effect persisted when 
the frame was coupled with the animated map showing temperature increases in the U.S. 
over time (p = .06).  
 Model 1 in Table 2 also reports evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 and 
Hypothesis 3. Exposure to counter-frames that highlight scientific uncertainty and the 
role of politics in shaping news the issue, in support of Hypothesis 2, undermines the 
positive effect of the flood and drought text’s impact on belief climate change is 
happening.  The effectiveness of each text frame is restored, however, in support of 
Hypothesis 3, when either text frame appears with an additional animated map, (Flood + 
Politicization + Map, p = .05; Drought + Politicization + Map, p = .01). Similarly, the 
positive impact of the text drought frame on perceptions about the personal importance of 
climate change vanished in the presence of counter-frames that emphasized scientific 
uncertainty (Model 3, Table 2), but the effect of the scientific consensus information was 
restored when it was presented with the animated map. The results suggest that effective 
visual frames in conjunction with congruent text frames can counter the negative effects 
that result from efforts to undermine scientific consensus information about climate 
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change.  Note that counter to Hypothesis 2 science politicization did not cancel out the 
impact that the text frames had on increasing respondents’ perceptions about the negative 
impacts that would occur as a result of climate change (Table 2, Model 2).  
Although not the focus of this paper, the results reported in each model confirm 
the expected relationships between party affiliation and climate beliefs.  Republicans 
(Democrats) are significantly less likely (more likely) than Independents (i.e., the omitted 
reference group in each model) to say that climate change is happening, that it will have 
negative effects, and to attach personal importance to the issue.  Higher levels of 
education are also associated with increased belief that climate change is happening and 
greater personal importance.  
    [Insert Table 2 here] 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that exposure to a frame highlighting the increased frequency 
and severity of environmental natural hazards such as heat waves, droughts and wildfires 
would shift respondents’ perceptions about the extent to which climate change affects 
daily weather.  The first column of results in Table 3 (Model 1) confirms this prediction. 
Exposure to the drought frame with or without the animated map significantly increased 
respondents’ belief that climate change is having an effect on daily weather (p = .01).   
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the positive effect of the textual frame in isolation 
disappears in the presence of a counter-frame introducing doubt.  However when the 
frame is reinforced by the presence of an animated map showing increased incidences of 
heat waves across the continental U.S. over time, in support of Hypothesis 3 climate 
science politicization’s effect is vitiated.   
    [Insert Table 3 here] 
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 To evaluate the degree to which the frames we employ shape not only beliefs but 
also behaviors, we regressed respondents’ interest in learning more about the effects of 
climate change in the U.S. on the experimental conditions.  The results are reported in 
Table 3 (Model 2).  First, we observe that drought text by itself or coupled with the 
animated map showing increased incidences of heat waves significantly increased 
respondents’ interest in learning more about climate change’s effects (p = .01).  The 
counter-frame introducing doubt eliminates the frame’s effect and the animated map does 
not vitiate this effect. The coastal flooding text frame presented in isolation had no effect 
on respondents’ interest in learning more about climate change (Model 2).  However, 
when the frame was presented with an animated map showing inundation of Boston, 
interest in learning more about climate change’s impacts on the U.S. increases 
significantly (p = .03), and this effect persists in the presence of the counter-frame (p = 
.05).  
 We also asked respondents to enter the maximum amount they would be willing 
to pay in additional taxes so that the U.S. government can prepare for climate change. 
The results, reported in Table 3 (Model 3), are similar to what we find for information-
seeking behavior.  First, the drought frame presented with or without the animated map 
significantly increases individuals’ reported willingness to pay additional yearly taxes to 
combat climate change (p = .01 and p =.08, respectively).  The counter-frame eliminates 
the frame’s effect and the map in conjunction with the text frame does not restore its 
impact. The textual frame highlighting coastal flooding does not have any effect on 
willingness to pay additional yearly taxes, but the animated map coupled with the textual 
frame significantly increases the reported amount people will contribute (p = .07).  A 
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counter-frame eliminates the effect of the animated flood map with the textual frame on 
willingness to pay more in additional taxes similar to its effect on behavior in the drought 
frame conditions.   The results reported in each model in Table 3 confirm the expected 
relationships between party affiliation and climate beliefs.  Republicans (Democrats) are 
significantly less likely (more likely) than Independents (i.e., the omitted reference group 
in each model) to say that climate change is affecting weather, want to learn more about 
climate change’s effects, or be willing to pay additional taxes to help reduce its impacts.  
Higher levels of education are also associated with increased interest in learning more 
about the effects of climate change and a greater willingness to pay more in taxes to 
combat its effects. 
Discussion 
 
 Major questions remain that need to be explored in future research.   First, 
although we recruited a large and diverse sample, it is not geographically representative 
enough to study questions regarding how living in areas that experience regular coastal 
flooding or extreme weather moderate the impact of the frames we employ, or how such 
factors may condition efforts to counteract climate science politicization.  Existing 
scholarship suggests that geographic factors may play a crucial role in how targeted 
audiences respond to strategic communications about climate change’s environmental 
effects (Howe et al., 2015; Zahran et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2018).  This is clearly an 
important area for future work.   
 Second, we also acknowledge that a host of individual-level factors may condition 
the impact of the frames and images within our experimental conditions, such as party 
identification, cultural worldviews, values, personality traits such as open-mindedness, 
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and other demographic characteristics.  A growing literature demonstrates that motivated 
reasoning plays a powerful role in shaping how citizens in the U.S. approach, process and 
evaluate strategic messages regarding climate change (Kahan, 2015; Kahan et al., 2012).  
In the real world, climate skeptics may seek out information that supports their existing 
beliefs or worldviews, avoid or dismiss information that challenges their opinions, and 
view evidence and arguments that reinforce their existing views as stronger – increasing 
polarization in the face of scientific communication efforts.  These processes are 
especially important to account for given the rise of social media and the ability of 
individuals who share similar views about climate change to interact with each other in 
homogenous discussion networks, creating “echo chambers” and further entrenching 
climate polarization (Hart, Feldman, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2015; Feldman, Myers, 
Hmielowski, & Leiserowitz, 2014).  This is beyond the scope of the present study, but 
future work should continue to document how such factors can moderate targeted climate 
science communications.  
 Third, additional work is also needed to understand how climate science 
politicization and frames emanating from different sources (e.g., party leaders, military 
officials, advocacy groups, etc.) affect receptiveness to such messages (Lupia, 2013; 
Druckman, 2015).  Given existing levels of partisan and ideological polarization on the 
issue of climate change in the U.S., and the increased likelihood of motivated reasoning 
in polarized political contexts, information that emanates from in-group sources may be 
much more effective than the same information provided from an out-group member.  
Yet few studies to date explore how varying the source of arguments or scientific 
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information associated with climate change affects different audiences in the U.S.  This is 
an area for future research.  
 Fourth, as in all experimental research, it will be important to translate these 
findings to practices that could increase the effectiveness of climate change information. 
At present, several private non-profit organizations have taken steps to provide 
prospective home-buyers and general citizens with very detailed and systematic visual 
portrayals of the likely impacts of sea level rise associated with climate change.  Two 
examples are Climate Central, the authors of the “surging seas” automated maps that 
were used in this study to illustrate the effects of sea level rise in Boston, funded by 
numerous donors including the Schmidt family foundation, the Kresge Foundation, the 
Rockefeller foundation and others (http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/about/funding), and 
the First Street Foundation, developer of a website whose goal is to provide information 
concerning tidal flooding and hurricane storm surge to home owner and home buyers 
(https://medium.com/firststreet/from-forprofit-to-nonprofit-eb8d1c4a9e16).  The impact 
that this type of localized and specific information has on dampening politicization of 
climate change science will need to be explored.   
Conclusion 
 The public’s perceptions of the risks presented by climate change and the steps 
they are willing to take to support adaptation or mitigation efforts are a crucial 
component of the socio-political context that can constrain or compel policy makers to 
address the issue (Leiserowitz, 2007; Campbell & Kay, 2014).  The ability of science to 
elevate public discourse on climate change, however, requires effective communication 
strategies (Druckman & Lupia, 2017; National Academy of Sciences, 2017).  The 
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politicization of climate science by actors seeking to sow doubt among the public has 
resulted in distrust among large segments of the US public, particularly conservatives and 
Republicans, resulting in polarization and stunted support for policy action (Druckman, 
2013).  This paper highlights a promising communication strategy that may help combat 
climate science politicization.   
The finding that compelling images that reinforce effective textual frames weaken 
climate science politicization is one that should prompt further exploration. As the 
communication intended to persuade audiences concerning everything from purchase 
decisions to political perspectives evolves from more traditional media to the use of 
personalized, social media and the use of visual imagery, it will be even more important 
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Description / N 
 
Hypotheses / Research Questions 
No Frame (Control) Baseline (N = 218) N/A 
Coastal Flooding Frame 
Textual frame only 
(N=221) 
 happening / impacts / 
importance / info-seeking / WTP 
tax 
Extreme Weather Frame 
Textual frame only 
(N=221) 
 happening / impacts / 
importance / info-seeking / WTP 
tax / *weather 
Coastal Flooding + 
Image (Boston) 
Text + Animated Map 
(N=221) 
 happening / impacts / 
importance / info-seeking / WTP 
tax 
Extreme Weather Frame 
+ Image (Heat Map) 
Text + Animated Map 
(N=222) 
 happening / impacts / 
importance / info-seeking / WTP 
tax / *weather 
   
Politicization Present   
Coastal Flooding Frame 
Competing text frames 
only 
(N=220) 
➔ Politicization undermines 
textual frame (no opinion shift) 
Extreme Weather Frame 
Competing text frames 
only (N=219) 
➔ Politicization undermines 
textual frame (no opinion shift) 
Coastal Flooding + 
Image (Boston) 
Competing text frames + 
Animated Map (N=223) 
Do images in conjunctions with 
the text overcome politicization’s 
effects? 
Extreme Weather Frame 
+ Image (Heat Map) 
Competing text frames + 
Animated Map (N=221) 
Do images in conjunctions with 












(Model 2) p-value 
Important 
(Model 3) p-value 
Flood text 0.20* 0.05 -0.16* 0.06 0.06 0.27 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Flood text+Map 0.23** 0.03 -0.23** 0.01 0.13* 0.09 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Flood text+Politicization 0.16 0.09 -0.15* 0.07 0.16* 0.06 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Flood+Politicization+Map 0.20** 0.05 -0.19* 0.03 0.16** 0.05 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Drought text 0.26** 0.02 -0.31*** 0.00 0.25** 0.01 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Drought text+Map 0.32*** 0.00 -0.37*** 0.00 0.15* 0.06 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Drought text+Politicization 0.14 0.13 -0.22** 0.02 0.06 0.27 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Drought+Politicization+Map 0.37*** 0.00 -0.26** 0.01 0.18** 0.04 
 (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.10)  
Republican -0.99*** 0.00 0.58*** 0.00 -0.62*** 0.00 
 (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.06)  
Democrat 0.72*** 0.00 -0.61*** 0.00 0.57*** 0.00 
 (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  
Education Level 0.09*** 0.00 0.01 0.41 0.05* 0.05 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  
Constant (Control) 5.29*** 0.00 2.90*** 0.00 3.01*** 0.00 
 (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.13)  
N 1981  1982  1982  
AIC 6603.8  5908.9  5794.7  
BIC 6670.9  5976.0  5861.8  
Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. One-tail p-values are 
presented adjacently. Coefficient estimates represent the average treatment effect, relative to the control 
group, for each treatment condition. The dependent variable in Model 1 is Happening (1–7 scale, definitely 
not happening to definitely happening); Model 2 is Impact (1–7 scale, extremely negative to extremely 
positive); Model 3 is Important (1–7 scale, extremely unimportant to extremely important). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 











Table 3: Treatment Effects – Affecting Weather, Learn More, Willingness to Pay  
 Affecting 
Weather 
(Model 1) p-value 
Learn 
More 
(Model 2) p-value 
Willingness 
to Pay 
(Model 3) p-value 
Flood text 0.05 0.29 0.16 0.14 9.78 0.22 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.40)  
Flood text+Map 0.11 0.13 0.29** 0.03 18.73* 0.07 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.42)  
Flood text+Politicization -0.04 0.35 0.25** 0.05 17.99* 0.07 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.44)  
Flood+Politicization+Map 0.22** 0.01 0.27** 0.03 9.66 0.22 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.35)  
Drought text 0.25*** 0.00 0.39*** 0.00 30.75*** 0.01 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.37)  
Drought text+Map 0.33*** 0.00 0.33*** 0.01 17.46* 0.08 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.37)  
Drought text+Politicization 0.07 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.55 0.48 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.41)  
Drought+Politicization+Map 0.27*** 0.00 0.17 0.12 11.70 0.17 
 (0.10)  (0.15)  (12.40)  
Republican -0.60*** 0.00 -0.78*** 0.00 -21.33*** 0.00 
 (0.06)  (0.10)  (8.05)  
Democrat 0.54*** 0.00 0.69*** 0.00 54.00*** 0.00 
 (0.06)  (0.08)  (7.13)  
Education Level 0.03 0.14 0.09** 0.01 14.82*** 0.00 
 (0.03)  (0.04)  (3.40)  
Constant (Control) 3.21*** 0.00 4.18*** 0.00 37.23** 0.01 
 (0.12)  (0.19)  (15.83)  
N 1981  1977  1971  
AIC 5649.9  7310.6  24757.6  
BIC 5717.0  7377.6  24824.6  
Note: Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. One-tail p-values are 
presented adjacently. Coefficient estimates represent the average treatment effect, relative to the control 
group, for each treatment condition. The dependent variable in Model 1 is Affecting Weather (1= not at all; 
5= a great deal); Model 2 is Learn More (1–7 scale, extremely uninterested to extremely interested); Model 






Figure 1. Images for Flooding and Temperature Increase Animation 
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